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Abstract 
 
Climate change and migration are major concerns in the MENA region, yet the empirical 
evidence on the impact of climate change and extreme weather events on migration 
remains limited. Information is broadly lacking on how households in vulnerable areas 
perceive changes in the climate, how they are affected by extreme weather events, 
whether they benefit from community and government programs to help them cope with 
and adapt to a changing climate, and how these conditions influence the decision of 
household members to migrate, either temporarily or permanently. This introductory 
chapter summarizes briefly the main results of the study which relied on existing data as 
well as focus groups and new household surveys collected in 2011 in Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Syria, and Yemen. The results suggest that households do perceive important 
changes in the climate, and that many households are being affected by extreme weather 
events resulting in losses in income, crops, and livestock. The coping and adaptation 
strategies used by households to deal with weather shocks are diverse, but also limited, 
with most households not able to recover from the negative impact of weather shocks. 
The ability of community level responses and government programs to support 
households is also very limited. Finally, while climate change is not today the main 
driver of migration flows, it does appear to contribute to these flows, and worsening 
climatic conditions are likely to exacerbate future migration flows. 
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1. Introduction 
Do households living in climate affected areas in the MENA region believe that changes 
in climate patterns and their environment are taking place? Have households been affected by 
extreme weather events, and in that case to what extent and which events have had the largest 
impact? What are the coping strategies that households declare having used, or could be using to 
cope with climate change and weather shocks? To what extent are perceived and actual changes 
in weather patterns and the environment driving temporary and permanent migration flows in 
MENA countries? Finally, to what extent do remittances reach households living in climate poor 
areas, and what is the impact of such remittances on poverty and human development indicators?  
It is widely acknowledged that the MENA region will be strongly affected by climate 
change, and yet the current evidence on the relationship between climate change and migration 
in the MENA region is weaker than in most other regions (see Foresight, 2011). This study is not 
meant to review the limited evidence on climate change in the MENA region, nor does it provide 
specific policy recommendations (for a recent study doing just that, see Verner, 2012; on the 
evidence and policies related to climate change worldwide, see World Bank, 2010; and on 
migration, see Foresight, 2011). The aim of the study is more modest: it is to provide new 
empirical evidence on the relationship between weather patterns, perceptions of climate change, 
and migration so that at least partial answers can be provided to the questions asked above.  
This introductory overview chapter summarizes the main results of the study. A more 
detailed synthesis is provided in chapter 2 (Wodon et al., 2014). The study is based in part on 
new household surveys collected in 2011 in climate affected areas in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Syria, and Yemen. On purpose, in order to achieve variability in the data collected, the selection 
of the countries and areas sampled within countries included some countries and areas highly 
vulnerable to droughts, as is the case in Syria, and others much less vulnerable, as is the case in 
Egypt (given that Egypt’s agriculture is mostly irrigated; note that the study does not consider 
the threat of sea level rise, which is especially severe in Egypt). The sample of countries also 
included low income countries such as Yemen, and higher income countries such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Morroco, and Syria. Finally, the sample included countries and areas affected by diverse 
types of extreme weather events, including both droughts and floods (for example in some areas 
of Morocco).  
Beyond survey data collection generating quantitative data, the study also relies in part on 
qualitative focus groups implemented in both urban and rural areas in the five countries in 2011. 
In addition, some of the analysis is based on previously existing survey data for Morocco, as well 
as survey and census data for Yemen. The context that led to the study and the literature to which 
it contributes, as well as the approach used for both quantitative and qualitative data collection 
are discussed in chapters 3 and 4. This introduction focuses on the main empirical results which 
are provided in a series of technical papers in chapters 5 through 13. 
One important caveat is required before presenting the main results. It is sometimes said 
that “Climate is what we expect. Weather is what we get.” Simply put, climate relates to the 
distribution of variables such as temperature and rainfall over a period of time, often 30 years at 
least. This distribution is characterized by its moments, including the mean and the variance of 
key climatic variables. Climate change is then used to refer to the change in the distribution of 
rainfall and temperature. However, it is difficult to tell if the weather experienced at any point in 
time is due to a change in climate (the overall mean and variance of rainfall and temperature) or 
is simply part of an existing distribution. The implication for this study is that our results do not 
provide clear new evidence on the direct relationship between climate change and migration per 
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se, but the results do contribute to the evidence on three specific related issues: 1) the impact of 
weather shocks on migration; 2) the impact of perceptions of recent climate change on migration; 
and 3) the impact of climate patterns (but not directly climate change) on migration. 
 
2. Perceptions and Impacts of Weather Shocks on Households 
Do households living in rural areas susceptible of being affected by climate change 
believe that changes in climate patterns are taking place? Questions on perceptions of climate 
change and migration were asked with a focus on events and changes that took place in the last 
five years, bur the analysis of migration is done both for the last five years and for longer 
periods.  
Table 1 from Adoho and Wodon (2014a), suggests that indeed households do believe that 
the climate has been changing in recent years. In the combined sample for the five countries 
where new household surveys were implemented, more than three fourths of households declare 
that rain has become more erratic, and almost three quarters say that temperatures are higher. 
Between half and two thirds declare that there is less rain today than five years ago, that the land 
is dryer or less fertile, that the rainy season starts later, is shorter, or ends earlier, and that 
droughts are more frequent. The changes in climate in turn appear to lead to more diseases in 
animals and livestock, more insects and pets in crops, less water in boreholes, rivers, lakes or 
streams, more air pollution, more frequent crop failures and livestock loss, and more soil erosion.  
Some of the extreme weather events associated with climate change such as rain storms and 
floods are not perceived as more frequent by a majority of households, and in some cases, 
households do suggest that temperatures are becoming cooler, and that there is more rain, but 
this is a minority of households. But overall, while there are differences between households and 
areas or countries, there is a clear perception that the climate is worsening.  
 
Table 1: Perceptions of Climate Change, Last Five Years, Five Countries Sample, 2011 (%) 
Perception % Perception % 
Rain more erratic 77.52 More diseases in animal and livestock 57.45 
Temperature is hotter 72.37 More insects and pets in crops 56.31 
Less Rain 66.57 Less water in boreholes, rivers, lakes or streams 56.11 
Land is dryer 64.84 More air pollution 55.59 
Less fertile land  62.24 More frequent crop failure 55.36 
Rainy season starts later 60.53 Rainy season end earlier 54.00 
Rain season is shorter 60.24 More frequent livestock loss 52.47 
More frequent droughts 59.09 More soil erosion 52.43 
Source: Adoho and Wodon (2014a). 
 
In focus groups as well the majority of respondents mentioned long-term shifts in climate 
and they attributed declining agriculture fortunes to deteriorating environmental conditions 
caused by changing weather patterns (Grant et al., 2014). For crops such as potatoes, wheat, and 
rice, the results may be devastating: “Rice is burnt in some seasons, because we cannot find 
enough water to irrigate it” (Male, 36-45 years old, Egypt1). The inability to earn a stable 
income for crops makes it difficult to rely solely on agriculture as a source of revenue. “The 
conditions [for] farming are very poor. There’s drought on the one hand and the unavailability 
                                                     
1 In the case of Egypt, the fact that much of the agriculture is irrigated means that results, including quotes from the 
qualitatiuve work, must be interpreted with care. When farmers are faced with lack of water, as this quote suggests, 
this may be related to shortages in the allocation of irrigation water which can themselves be due to any number of 
problems that need not be related to climate change, such as the upstream use of the Nile water by others.  
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of the new equipment and poor methods we use on the other hand. … All farmers in this region 
have been affected by the drought and lost their yields (Male, 35-45 years old, Algeria).” In 
Yemen, residents from Hudaydah emphasized the problems of warm weather and increasing heat 
waves. Furthermore, unfavorable crop prices have led some growers to shift from cultivating 
food crops to qat which is more profitable but requires a great deal of water: “People there [in 
villages] work shoulder to shoulder, but the problem lies in agriculture. They have stopped 
cultivating crops … and replaced them with qat” (Male, 30-39 years old, Yemen). Importantly, 
as shown in table 2, many households are affected by weather shocks, especially in terms of crop 
and income losses, but also in terms of losses in livestock and less fish caught. 
 
Table 2: Economic Impacts of Weather Shocks, Five Countries Sample, 2011 (%) 
  Quintiles All   Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest 
Lost income 46.37 44.14 43.21 29.25 20.72 36.59 
Lost crops 58.12 61.96 62.13 49.42 42.10 54.62 
Lost livestock or cattle 23.81 25.19 30.11 23.17 15.23 23.43 
Less fish caught 9.51 10.27 8.90 9.65 4.69 8.60 
Source: Adoho and Wodon (2014a). 
 
Additional information on perceptions about the climate, weather shocks, and their 
impact on households is available for Morocco through special modules on climate change and 
shocks incorporated in a national survey implemented in 2009-10 (Nguyen and Wodon, 2014a). 
In the survey, as shown in table 3, 28.1 percent of households were involved in agriculture, and 
among those 92.1 percent declared having been affected by deteriorating climatic conditions in 
the last five years. The most likely shock was a reduction in agricultural yields due to inadequate 
rainfall, mentioned by 62.2 percent of agricultural households. In a separate part of the survey, 
more than one in five households declared having been affected by a recent weather shock such 
as a drought or flood. Most of the households who were affected declared that they had not been 
able to recover from the shock, and this was especially the case among poorer households. 
According to regression analysis, households in the top quintile of wealth were 20 percentage 
points more likely to recover from weather shocks than households in the bottom quintile. 
 
Table 3: Weather Shocks and Impact on Agriculture, Morocco 2009-10 (%) 
  
Poorest 
Quintile 
Wealthiest 
quintile All 
Household has a member involved in agriculture or related activities 70.69 5.30 28.07 
Among household in agriculture, share affected by climate-related shock    Reduction in agricultural yields due to inadequate rainfall 60.98 50.35 62.18 
Reduction in agricultural yields due to too much water 39.89 19.15 38.17 
Poor soil quality due to erosion reducing agricultural yields 22.91 16.51 21.80 
Changing and unpredictable climate and temperatures reducing agricultural yields 34.84 22.89 34.51 
Pest or locust infestation reducing agricultural yields 14.13 7.08 17.21 
Reduced job opportunities in the agricultural sector 43.75 34.15 43.86 
Death of livestock due to bad weather conditions 28.37 10.41 26.44 
Reduction in stock of livestock due to lower availability of grazing land 37.55 10.61 31.24 
At least one problem in the last five years 93.09 81.20 92.10 
Source: Nguyen and Wodon (2014a). 
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3. Coping and Adaptation Strategies 
What are the coping strategies that households declare having used, or could be using to 
cope with climate change and weather shocks? In the five country sample, 60.6 percent of 
households declare that they have used or would use their savings, 46.8 have sold or would sell 
their assets, 46.2 percent have asked for a loan or would do so, 40.6 percent have sold or would 
sell their livestock, and 36.4 percent have withdrawn or would withdraw their children from 
school (Adoho and Wodon, 2014b). The proportions of households resorting to these coping 
strategies are higher among lower quintiles which have fewer other means to cope. There are 
differences between countries, especially regarding the possibility of withdrawing children from 
school – in Egypt this is not being considered by most households. Also, households receiving 
international remittances, who tend to be better off, are less likely to resort to these various 
coping strategies, except using their savings. The qualitative focus groups also reveal different 
coping strategies, including selling assets, shifting food consumption habits, and removing 
children from school to have them support the household (Grant et al., 2014).  
 Households were also asked about actions that they took or might take to cope with the 
loss of crops, income or livestock due to weather or environmental changes. As shown in table 4 
from Adoho and Wodon (2014b), between one in four and one in five households have relied or 
would rely more on stored grains/products and stored water, have sought or would seek off-farm 
work, have used or would use more fertilizers or pesticides, or have made or would make a 
change in their farm production technology. Undertaking training for non-farm work or changing 
crop mixes and varieties is mentioned by about 15 percent of households, versus only nine 
percent for changing the crops versus livestock mix. Thus most households do not implement 
many adaptation strategies. However more than four in ten households say that they know people 
who have moved out of the community due to climate pressures, and 14 percent say that some 
people have moved in, which may generate conflict over water, land, or livestock.  
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Table 4: Adaptive Strategies of Households to Deal with Climate Change and Shocks (%) 
  Change in 
production 
technology 
Change in 
crops mix 
or 
varieties 
Change 
in crops 
vs. 
livestock 
More 
fertilizers/ 
pesticides 
Seeking 
non-farm 
work 
Training 
for non-
farm 
work 
Share of households 19.35 15.53 8.89 21.12 22.67 15.09 
  Use of 
stored 
water 
Stored 
grains/ 
products 
People 
moving 
out 
People 
moving in 
Conflict 
over land, 
livestock 
Conflict 
over 
water 
Share of households  20.54 28.37 40.29 13.99 12.85 8.35 
Source: Adoho and Wodon (2014b). 
 
The qualitative work suggests that residents often rely on each other to cope and adapt: 
“Rural residents are willing to pay [give] half of what we have to help others. If I have 10 
pounds, I will pay 5. If I have 100 pounds, I will pay 50. This is how the social norms work here. 
We are all one family” (Male, 36-45 years old, Egypt). Yet solidarity does not always work, and 
conflicts over natural resources do occur due to changes in climate, as the estimates in table 3 
show. In Yemen in particular, rural residents worried in the focus groups that water scarcity has 
led to conflict over access to wells. One Yemeni woman described a water distribution scheme 
where water is distributed to certain communities on certain days of the week.  For farmers in all 
five countries, living in impoverished rural areas is not only difficult financially, but it also has 
negative impacts for health, a concern mentioned in Egyptian focus groups. Farmers may be 
increasingly exposed to contaminated water because waste leaks into irrigation canals. Others 
mention being sick. With only limited income at their disposal, many households cannot afford 
quality health care and they also often cannot access health facilities (Grant et al., 2014). 
What about community level responses? Households were asked whether to cope with 
the loss of crops, income or livestock due to weather or environmental changes, the communities 
in which they live did any of the following: planting trees or installing soil protection measures; 
building banks on rivers, streams or small check banks to reduce flooding; developing new 
infrastructure such as boreholes, wells, irrigation or roads; gathering and disseminating 
information on measures to reduce the loss of crops, income or livestock; taking measures to 
prepare for future disasters like floods or droughts; taking action to improve market access for 
agricultural products or handicrafts; and taking action to purchase seeds, animals or farm 
equipment. In most cases community action is limited. As shown by Adoho and Wodon (2014b), 
only one in five households declare that the community has planted trees or taken soil erosion 
measures, and one in seven mentioned measures to purchase seeds, animals or farm equipment. 
The other actions are mentioned by only one in ten households or less.  
Similar questions were asked about governments, albeit with slightly different modalities, 
including more transfers and social protection programs, such as cash or food for work programs, 
cash for food during floods and droughts, as well as the provision of drinking water, the 
provision of skills training programs, the provision of credit during crop loss, improvements in 
access to markets through transportation, and price support for crops when agricultural prices are 
low. Except for the provision of drinking water which is probably less related to climate change 
and shocks, government involvement in adaptation strategies and safety nets is also limited. For 
most programs, only about one in ten households declared that the government has been active.  
The fact that community and government programs to help households cope with weather 
shocks and adapt to climate change are the exception rather than the rule was also a conclusion 
of the qualitative work. When asked about such programs, respondents said that they were aware 
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of few programs and organizations geared towards assisting the rural poor affected by climate 
change. Participants suggested areas where government initiatives could help, such as the 
provision of agricultural inputs or loans to purchase machinery. Job training and improved 
employment opportunities were also mentioned. Yet some respondents, especially in Yemen, 
were doubtful that government program would bear fruit, due to corruption and distrust.  
 
4. Migration 
Migration is also a widespread strategy to cope with and adapt to changes in climatic and 
environmental conditions. In the five country sample, the data suggest that three in every ten 
households (29.9 percent) have migrants, whether residents (current members of the households) 
or non-residents (former members of the household). Lower rates are obtained when restricting 
migration to the last five years. At the individual level, 7.6 percent of individuals in the sample 
as a whole have migrated temporarily, and the proportion over the last five years is 6.2 percent. 
For permanent migration, the rates are 8.0 percent in the sample as a whole, and 5.7 percent in 
the last five years (Adoho and Wodon, 2014c). Most migration is internal, but the likelihood of 
migration abroad is high in Egypt and also in general higher for individuals from higher 
quintiles, as expected due to the cost of international migration. For both residents and non-
residents, migration to urban areas, and especially to large cities, is much more likely than 
migration to rural areas.  
To what extent are households migrating away from climate affected areas, and is climate 
itself a key push factor in such migration? This is a complex question. Regression results suggest 
that poor climate and extreme weather events lead to a higher probability of migration, but the 
role of climate is smaller than that of socio-economic characteristics and job prospects in cities. 
More precisely, data from the five country sample are used by Adoho and Wodon (2014c) to 
construct two indices or factors that summarize household perceptions regarding changes in 
weather patterns and the environment. The first factor captures the extent to which households 
perceive that the climate is becoming dryer and warmer, and it is associated with droughts. The 
second factor captures the extent to which households suffer from excess water, and it is 
associated with floods. Both factors are normalized and take a value between zero and one.  
In the regression analysis with the five country sample, higher values for both factors 
(i.e., worse climatic conditions) result in higher rates of resident or temporary migration, with the 
coefficients being statistically significant and the effects of each of the two factors of a similar 
order of magnitude. The effects for non-resident or permanent migration are similar, although 
statistically significant only for the whole period, as opposed to the last five years. Thus overall 
higher values for both factors result in higher rates of both temporary and permanent migration, 
but with weaker evidence for permanent migration. The regression estimates suggest that a 
significant deterioration of climatic conditions would lead to an increase of about 1.5 percentage 
point for both types of migration. Given the overall migration rate, this increase would represent 
between one tenth and one fifth of the overall level of migration observed, and its magnitude is 
of an order of magnitude similar to that obtained when considering the reasons stated by 
households for the migration of some of their members.  
Additional evidence for Morocco from Nguyen and Wodon (2014b) using the national 
survey for 2009-2010 mentioned earlier suggest that weather shocks increase the likelihood of 
temporary migration by slightly more than one percentage point, an order of magnitude again 
similar to that observed in the five country sample. While in the Morocco national survey, the 
impact of weather shocks on permanent migration is not statistically significant, the impact of 
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changing structural conditions such as reduced agricultural yields due to lack of water is, and it 
does contribute to higher permanent migration away from the affected areas. Finally, using a 
different approach based on combining census and weather station data from Yemen, Joseph and 
Wodon (2014a) find that climate variables do affect migration from some districts to other 
districts, but in a somewhat limited way, with socio-economic and cost factors playing a much 
more prominent role. This analysis, which is based on past data, suggest that migration flows are 
unlikely to increase sharply in the near term, but if conditions were to change drastically, the 
effect of weather variables on migration could become much larger (Joseph et al., 2014a).  
The focus groups data reported in Grant et al. (2014) also suggest a link between climate 
and migration, although again the role of socio-economic factors is probably at least as important 
as that of climatic conditions. Respondents linked migration to chronic droughts which lead to 
declining agricultural productivity: “The lack of water has resulted in a failure to be able to 
cultivate rice and it is an important crop” (Male, 25-35 years old, Dakhalia, Egypt). On the other 
hand, few mentioned flooding or being displaced as a result of natural disasters as a reason for 
relocation. Respondents appear to choose migration after other strategies have proven 
unsuccessful. The qualitative work also suggests that remittances are important, especially in 
Yemen where there is a long-standing tradition of migration to Saudi Arabia. But conversely 
consequences can be severed in the absence of remittances: “My brother is in Saudi Arabia. He 
used to send me money all of the time and we were well off, even when I wasn’t working. [But] 
we lost the house and everything we [owned] because of the discontinuity of these aids. We live 
at God’s mercy” (Male, 30-45 years old, Hudaydah, Yemen). Participants in focus groups from 
Morocco and Algeria did not depend on remittances as much. Though urban residents in Algeria, 
Morocco, Syria and Egypt overwhelmingly report sending remittances back home, Yemeni 
urban respondents by contrast were more likely to receive remittances from family members 
working abroad, especially again from Saudi Arabia.  
What happens to the migrants once they leave? Many migrants hope to work and save 
enough to own their own business (a small store or shop). Finding jobs, however, is not an easy 
feat amid widespread joblessness found throughout the region given that unemployment levels 
hover around 15 percent, and a much higher 20 to 40 percent among youth 15 to 30 years old. 
While some migrants find urban communities receptive, others say they were met with hostility: 
“They look at us and call us ‘Berber countrymen’. They think we are invaders” (Male, 18-25 
years old, Casablanca, Morocco). Some rural migrants said that they felt disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
urban dwellers because they lacked what is needed to secure proper employment, especially a 
degree and French-and Arabic-speaking capability, both of which tend to be needed even for 
jobs requiring minimal skills. For Yemenis, the main obstacle to finding a job may be corruption, 
which appears to be deep and pervasive: “You need to bribe your way into a position” (Male, 
30-39 years old, Sanaa). Finding adequate housing was also a challenge: “I’m 39, married, with 
five kids and I don’t have a flat of my own. I pay 300 Egyptian pounds per month and cannot 
have a flat. Why don’t they grant me one? They say you have to rent for just one year, and then it 
all depends on the owner” (Male, 36-45 years old, Cairo, Egypt). “We live on top of each other. 
There’s no privacy. Sometimes you get your money stolen” (Male, 18-25 Casablanca, Morocco).  
Established communities that share potential migrants’ lineage, tribe, or ethnic 
background ease the transition. Many focus group respondents spoke of relying on relatives or 
family friends as an intermediary for finding a job and a place to live. Networks also ease 
feelings of isolation. Participants mentioned that they now have only limited interactions with 
their neighbors, if they are fortunate to know them at all. In the words of one Egyptian woman: 
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“Neighbors are close in the villages. Here [in Cairo], I don’t know my neighbors, what their job 
is or how they live” (Female, 36-45 years old, Cairo, Egypt). They also lamented the shift of 
emphasis away from family and traditions. Crime and harassment were also mentioned. Yet 
while life in the city is more “chaotic”, it is also exciting and full of opportunity. In Morocco for 
example migration appeared to widen the options available to young immigrants as young 
respondents expressed a greater sense of independence, belonging, and self-actualization.  
Table 5 summarizes in a very stylized way the main results from the analysis. The 
evidence suggests that worsening climatic conditions, or the perceptions thereof, are clearly a 
push factor leading to temporary migration away from the affected (mostly rural) areas, but the 
evidence is a bit weaker for permanent migration. It must be noted that in an analysis such as that 
of Joseph and Wodon (2013) which is at the level of a country as a whole, the impact of the 
climate on the overall patterns of migration tends to be diluted. By contrast, in the analysis based 
on the five countries sample, as well as when looking at weather shocks with the national 
Morocco survey, the effects are estimated mostly on those affected by these shocks, which also 
explains why the impacts are larger in affected areas. In those areas, it seems fair to suggest that 
climatic conditions account for at least 10 to 20 percent of the current migration flows, and this 
could increase in the future. 
 
Table 5: Summary Results from Regression Analysis on Weather Shocks and Migration 
Variables Country Paper Temporary Permanent Magnitude 
Perceptions of climate change 5 countries Adoho & Wodon (2014c) + Weak Medium 
Recall of weather shocks and  
structural changes in climate 
Morocco Nguyen & Wodon (2014b) +  
Weak  
 
Medium 
Actual climate variables 
 
Yemen Joseph & Wodon (2013) 
Joseph et al. (2014) 
Not 
applicable 
+ 
 
Small 
Qualitative focus groups 5 countries Grant et al. (2014) + + Substantial 
Source: Authors. NA = not applicable. 
 
5. Remittances 
 The last part of the study includes two chapters looking at remittances in the case of 
Yemen. There is evidence in the literature that migration and remittances tend to increase in 
response to climate shocks, so that both may function as coping mechanisms. It is not clear 
however whether remittances are likely to be higher in areas that suffer from poor climate in the 
absence of weather shocks. The first chapter in the last part of the study by Joseph, Wodon, and 
Blankespoor (2014) use a national household survey for Yemen combined with weather data to 
measure remittance flows, both domestic and international, and assess the likelihood of 
households receiving remittances as well as the amounts received. The question is whether 
households living in less favorable areas in terms of climate (as measured through higher 
temperatures, lower rainfalls, more variability or seasonality in both, and larger differences in a 
given year between extreme temperatures) are more likely to benefit from remittances. The 
results suggest that this is not the case in Yemen. 
In the last chapter of the study, Joseph and Wodon (2014b) use matching techniques and 
the same household survey for Yemen combined with weather data to measure the impact of 
remittances, both domestic and international, on poverty and human development outcomes 
(school enrolment, immunization, and malnutrition). The estimations are carried both nationally 
and in areas with favorable and unfavorable climate. Four main results are obtained. First, 
remittances – which are substantial in Yemen – tend to have positive impacts on poverty 
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measures, school enrollment, and measures of malnutrition. Second, the impact of international 
remittances tends to be larger than that of domestic remittances, probably because among 
beneficiaries, the amount of remittances received tends to be higher for international than for 
domestic remittances. Third, the impact of remittances – and especially international remittances 
– on measures of poverty and malnutrition tends to be larger in areas affected by high 
temperatures, and also to some extent in areas with lower levels of rainfall, which in both cases 
tend to be more vulnerable. Fourth, and by contrast, in areas with higher levels of rainfall or 
lower levels of temperatures, where issues of poverty and malnutrition may be less severe, 
remittances – and again especially international remittances – tend to have a larger impact on 
school enrollment. Thus, in areas with unfavorable climate, remittances help first for meeting 
basic needs in order to escape poverty and malnutrition, while in areas with more favorable 
climate, remittances may be used more for investments, including in the education of children. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications  
A solid foundation for decision making related to climate change adaptation involves four 
iterative steps: (1) Assessing climate risks, impacts, and opportunities for action; (2) Prioritizing 
policy and project options; (3) Implementing responses in sectors and regions; and (4) 
Monitoring and evaluating implementation, then reassessing the climate risks, impacts, and 
opportunities (Verner, 2012). Our work falls squarely within the first of these four steps. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of 
perceptions of climate change, environmental degradation, and extreme weather events and their 
relationship to migration and other coping strategies in the MENA region. Quantitative and 
qualitative data collection activities were implemented in climate-affected areas in five countries, 
and existing census and survey data for Morocco and Yemen were used as well. The analysis 
suggests that a majority of households do perceive important changes in the climate, such as 
more erratic rain, higher temperatures, less rain, dryer and less fertile land and more frequent 
droughts.  
These changes have led to a range of negative consequences for agriculture and livestock 
production, and extreme weather events have been associated with losses in incomes, crops, and 
livestock.  The coping and adaptation strategies used by households to deal with shocks are 
diverse, including migration, selling various assets and taking other emergency measures to get 
by, as well as changing the household’s sources of livelihoods in terms of crops, livestock 
production, and off-farm work among others. Yet many households do not appear to use these 
strategies, and in addition the extent to which they benefit from community and government 
programs and initiatives to help them cope with weather or environmental changes is limited.  
In terms of migration, the study suggests that the impact of weather shocks and 
deteriorating conditions on migration is positive, leading to higher temporary and permanent 
migration. In the areas most affected by climate change, the analysis suggests that climate factors 
may account for between one tenth and one fifth of the overall level of migration observed today, 
but this is likely to increase as climatic conditions continue to deteriorate.  Furthermore, while 
many migrants appreciate the opportunities that migration offer, their living conditions and their 
ability to be well integrated in their areas of destination is far from being guaranteed, especially 
given intense competition for relatively few good job opportunities. 
Beyond addressing an existing research gap though, the findings provide much ground 
for policy development. Five broad areas of implications for policy are highlighted below.  
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First, affected communities call for more government action to help with adaptation. In 
line with the conclusions reached in the recent study led by Verner (2012) on adaptation in the 
MENA region, we have shown the extent to which households in vulnerable rural areas are 
affected by climate change and weather shocks, and how their ability to cope and adapt to these 
shocks is limited. The cost of climate change and weather shocks is already felt today by many 
rural households, who are essentially left on their own in the absence of strong community 
responses and government programs in the geographic areas studied. While we have not 
conducted any cost-benefit analysis to assess which types of programs might help households the 
most in rural sending areas - such analysis would need to take local conditions into account, we 
have demonstrated the need for more assistance in order to help households cope and adapt, 
given the substantial damage already caused to livelihoods by changing weather patterns. The 
populations sampled in this study perceive a lack of effective government interventions to 
address the impacts of climate change and the migration it generates, and collective action 
solutions do not seem to work. The gap in the public provision and financing of adaption 
interventions leaves individuals and communities alone in making choices and decisions, 
including through migration. Although this leaves space for private initiatives, it also leaves the 
space vulnerable to forms of uncoordinated action that may lead to conflict and maladaptation.  
The role of safety nets and broader social protection programs is especially important in 
this context, both for migrants and their families in sending areas. MENA governments should be 
encouraged to adopt and expand the coverage of their social protection and safety net programs. 
The coverage of those programs appears very thin in the areas surveyed for this study. 
Investments in safety net systems could have immediate pay-offs in the short-run as well as in 
the long-run when the consequences of climatic change may become more obvious. In addition, 
it would be important to highlight the fact that the design, coverage and placement of safety net 
programs would not be just for the purpose of minimizing the future impacts of climate change; 
instead safety nets should be seen as an integral part of the governments' broader strategy 
towards poverty reduction and urbanization and they should provide portable skills and human 
capital to the segments of the population that need it the most (we come back to this below). 
Second, migration policy needs to understand and address climate induced migration in 
the context of other push and pull factors. The study has shown that while environmental and 
climatic factors do play a role in driving migration, a range of other socio-economic factors are 
at play. Although uncertainties remain as to the magnitude of future climate change and its 
effects on migration, focusing on environmental degradation alone as the dominant driver of 
migration would be misleading. Similarly, characterizing environmental degradation as key 
driver of transborder migration is also potentially misleading: in the countries studies, when 
environmental factors play a role, migration is mostly internal. These findings run somewhat 
against the received wisdom behind much of the recent global hype around climate migration, 
but they are in line with the results of other assessments, including the recently released 
Foresight report on environmental change and migration (Foresight, 2011). Identifying climate 
migration more squarely as a domestic policy issue will lead to a different type of attention to the 
problem for both domestic policy makers in MENA countries and donors alike.  
Third, migration can be conceived of as a form of adaptation, but it is often seen as a 
solution of last resort by households, especially in the qualitative work presented in this study. 
One reason for this is that migration may be perceived as more costly than other strategies such 
as using savings, selling assets, getting into debt, or withdrawing children from school. In 
addition to material costs (travelling and re-lodging), migration implies substantial risks due to 
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unknown outcomes (finding other forms of livelihood) in addition to immaterial costs such those 
as stemming from the uprooting of individuals, households, and sometimes even communities. In 
some cases, those left behind, whether at the level of the household or the community may be 
precluded from reaping the benefits from migration, especially when remittances are hampered 
by the high cost of remitting or by the fact that migrants have a hard time finding jobs.  
At the same time policy responses and development interventions need to recognize that 
migration represents a viable and legitimate mechanism through which people can address risks 
to their livelihoods and wider well-being, and a means of adapting to climate change and its 
impacts. A key question for migration policy is therefore where migration should be treated as a 
risk to be managed and mitigated, and where it should be treated as an opportunity to be 
facilitated or even encouraged. Enabling communities in sending areas to better leverage the 
potential benefits of migration and increase their adaptive capacity is often a better alternative 
than their progressive displacement. The effective economic insertion of migrants in urban areas 
leads to opportunities for the sending communities, particularly thanks to the transfer of 
remittances. For example, the evidence from the surveys and the qualitative work suggests a 
positive impact of remittances in areas affected by climate shocks, especially in terms of human 
development outcomes. Without a facilitating environment though, remittances are too often 
turned into pure consumption and the accumulation of non-productive assets. This type of assets 
can be of little value both in terms of preventive and ex-post adaptation, as their investment 
contribution is limited and they are not liquid enough to be used when climate impacts strike, at 
which point their value can drop. Policy should focus on leveraging the impacts of remittances 
by encouraging their productive use, for instance by subsidizing forms of de-fiscalization for 
remittances-funded investments and community saving schemes which also facilitate financial 
integration and increase liquidity.  
Fourth, urban development policy is a fundamental component of the policy package to 
address climate induced migration. Most of the study focuses on sending areas, but the 
qualitative work conducted in urban areas suggests that the integration of migrants into major 
destination cities is not working as well as it should. The study shows that climate induced 
migration tends to be towards cities, mostly large ones. The policy responses to climate shocks 
and migration are therefore to be found in cities as much as in sending areas. Concerns about 
employment and housing abound among migrants, with migration simply adding to existing 
pressures that can be dealt with only through broad-based economic development not necessarily 
focused on migration per se. The climate induced migration problem should be part of a broader 
policy debate about urbanization. Most MENA countries are rapidly urbanizing. While the share 
of the urban population in the region was at 48 percent in 1980, it almost reached 60 percent in 
2000 and is expected to reach 70 percent by 2015. The way MENA policy makers will address 
the challenges posed by climate induced migration is related to how they will manage to promote 
an urbanization model that welcomes the contribution of migrants to the development of cities.  
Fifth, policy should focus on providing migrants with the portable skills and capabilities 
they need to fully exploit the adaptation potential of migration. All too often the policy debate 
focuses on whether migration should be encouraged or not. The study has shown that climate-
induced migration is already taking place. It must therefore be accompanied. The provision of 
education and training can help potential migrants better grasp labor market opportunities both in 
sending and receiving areas, adapt to new living conditions, and shift more easily among jobs in 
different sectors. An emphasis on basic and portable skills would be effective regardless of the 
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causes, timing, and destination of the migration decisions involved. And it would benefit not 
only those that leave, but also those that decide to stay or eventually return.  
 Sixth, while dealing with climate induced migration will require some interventions 
specifically aimed at migrants, the policy package needed to deal with both climate change and 
migration is much broader. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. This is an opportunity 
because several levers can be applied to better leverage migration’s potential for adaptation and 
development. But this is also a challenge because an integrated policy response will require a 
level of coordination and commitment that is likely to arise only through broader governance 
reforms and strong political leadership in MENA countries. 
Finally, it is worth investigating how safeguards could play a role in reducing the risk that 
development initiatives result in negative impacts. For example, could inadvertent increases in 
the vulnerability of certain groups take place as a by-product of policies and projects that may or 
may not address climate change directly, such as adaptation initiatives involving resettlement 
and relocation? Is there a risk of maladaptation associated with interventions that are founded on 
unjustified assumptions about future climatic conditions and may thereby increase dependence or 
pressure on resources threatened by climate change? How to design safeguard mechanisms is a 
complex issue, if only because policy responses related to migration differ depending on whether 
one considers sudden-onset climate-related disasters or long-term climate-related environmental 
changes. But the fact that such safeguard mechanisms are needed is not itself in question.  
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